Intention in Action (Book Review)

Rayappan, Pathiaraj. Intention in Action: The Philosophy of G.E.M. Anscombe. Bern/Berlin/Bruxelles/Frankfurtam Main/New York/Oxford/Wien: Peter Lang, 2010. ISSN 0721-3417; 978-3-0343-0471-9.

Pathiaraj Rayappan is a Catholic priest presently teaching in Jnanodaya, Salesian College of Philosophy and Religion, Yercaud, Salem. He holds to his credit a Master degree in philosophy from Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune, India, and a Master of Arts from Osmania University, Hyderabad, India. In 2010 he successfully completed his doctoral dissertation on “Intention in Action: The Philosophy of G.E.M. Anscombe” and obtained his doctorate from the Salesian Pontifical University, Rome. He contributes his might to the academic world by his articles and he is the editor of the Jnanodaya Journal of Philosophy.

The book Intention in Action: The Philosophy of G.E.M Anscombe is the doctoral dissertation of the author. The book consists of five chapters with a bibliography. The author speaks of the relevance of Anscome’s moral philosophy to the world that has become increasingly apprehensive of the Catholic moral principles. The first chapter serves as a prolegomenon of the book. In it the author, together with the brief life sketch of G.E.M Anscombe, presents the philosophical foundations of her moral philosophy. Anscombe was drawn to Catholicism in her teens and from then on she remained a firm Catholic, upholding the validity of the Catholic moral principles. She read the works of Aristotle (Etica Nicomachea) and St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae). She was a friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein and was well acquainted with his works. However, she held views different from Wittgenstein. Aristotle in his Etica Nicomachea teaches his students to distinguish hekousin (voluntary action) from akousion (involuntary action) so as to perform “virtuous actions” in accordance with “right reason.” For Aristotle a person is accountable in as much as his acts are hekousin and not akousion. Aristotle further speaks of prohairesis (an act pursued for an end) that necessarily includes hekousin. For Anscombe prohairesis of Aristotle is the modern notion ‘intention.’ However the problem with Aristotle is his attribution of prohairesis to children and animals.

St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes human acts from acts of human by ascribing knowledge and will to the former. Reason and will are interrelated. Reason, for St. Thomas, moves the will and commands itself. Reason governs the human act. For St. Thomas animals and children does not attribute intention to animals as reason and will are absent in them. Voluntary act of St. Thomas is the intentional act for Anscombe.

The second chapter contains Anscombe’s analysis of Intention. Intention, for Anscombe, is expressed in human actions; but intentions do not guarantee human acts. In other words, a good intention need not necessarily move one to do good. An intentional act has a reason, a why for it. For Anscombe the knowledge of intention is “non-observational” and “practical.”

In chapter three the author evaluates moral acts and moral theories based on intention. He presents Anscombe’s analysis of social problems such as war, contraceptive sex and contracts. The author brings out Anscombe’s anti-consequentialist views by discussing these problems. Anscombe considers Brittan’s decision to go for war with Germany in 1939 (World War II) and United States nuclear-bombing of Japan as unethical in as much the “means chosen to achieve the end are also intended.” She attributes to consequentialism the behavior of the leaders of both the countries. Regarding contraceptive intercourse she endorses the views of the Church. For her, though the physical act in contraceptive sex is as same as in a natural intercourse the “inherent intention” to prevent the possibility of life makes it morally wrong. In contraceptive sex the persons are no more subjects but objects of enjoyment. However, criticisms mount as she suggests safe period sex to prevent pregnancy.  While she acknowledges the importance of considering the consequences of an act, her main criticism against the consequentialists is their lack of ‘foresight.’

The fourth chapter contains the debates that erupted among philosophers soon after the publication of Anscombe’s Insight.  Themes such as “under a description,” individuation of action,” “causation of action,” and “non-observational knowledge” are discussed. Anscombe in her analysis of intention in action takes for granted the Catholic moral principles.

Chapter five, Action and Moral Subject, is divided into four parts. The author explains as to how Martin Rhonheimer with his Thomistic background can complement to that which is lacking in the philosophy of Anscombe. Anscombe’s analysis of intention is “linguistic” rather than “metaphysical.” Rhonheimer goes beyond intention in his analysis of man as the combination of body and spirit. And therefore, the goal of sexual intercourse is “loving bodily union” regardless of its fruit. In contraceptive sex the loving bodily union does not exist; the subjects turn out to be an object to each other. Thus Rhonheimer rectifies the weakness of Anscombe’s recourse to intention by relying on St. Thomas.

In the general conclusion to the book the author recapitulates the whole book. The book is readable and the many foot notes make the book more scientific and systematic. The themes develop gradually, from the place of intention in the history of philosophy (before Anscombe) to Anscombe analysis of intention in human act and the aftermath of her contribution. The book certainly is an exposition of Catholic moral philosophy. The author deserves our sincere appreciation as he sheds light into moral problems of our times by employing Anscombe’s analysis of intention in action.